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Seismologists from Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States have rescued the Soviet-era archive of
nuclear explosion seismograms recorded at Borovoye in northern Kazakhstan during the period 1966–
1996. The signals had been stored on about 8000 magnetic tapes, which were held at the recording obser-
vatory. After hundreds of man-years of work, these digital waveforms together with signiﬁcant metadata
are now available via the project URL, namely http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Data/ as
a modern open database, of use to diverse communities.
Three different sets of recording systems were operated at Borovoye, each using several different seis-
mometers and different gain levels. For some explosions, more than twenty different channels of data are
available. A ﬁrst data release, in 2001, contained numerous glitches and lacked many instrument
responses, but could still be used for measuring accurate arrival times and for comparison of the
strengths of different types of seismic waves. The project URL also links to our second major data release,
for nuclear explosions in Eurasia recorded in Borovoye, in which the data have been deglitched, all instru-
ment responses have been included, and recording systems are described in detail.
This second dataset consists of more than 3700 waveforms (digital seismograms) from almost 500
nuclear explosions in Eurasia, many of them recorded at regional distances. It is important as a training
set for the development and evaluation of seismological methods of discriminating between earthquakes
and underground explosions, and can be used for assessment of three-dimensional models of the Earth’s
interior structure.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Seismic monitoring was developed in Kazakhstan by the USSR
from the mid-1960s to the end of the Soviet era in 1991 with cen-
tral planning from Moscow, in the specialized context of military
programs to monitor nuclear weapons testing at sites around the
world. Under these programs, high quality work was performed
in seismometer design and construction, in ﬁeld surveys to dis-
cover suitable sites for instrument deployment, and in the develop-
ment of methods of data analysis and interpretation.
Kazakhstan turned out to provide superb sites for seismometer
operation, because:(a) the whole country is deep within the interior of the Eurasian
continent, a long way from the usual ocean-wave sources of seis-
mic noise, so that sites could readily be found that were very quiet;
and (b) the geological structures, particularly of Northern
Kazakhstan, allow seismic waves to propagate very efﬁciently,
with minimal attenuation and minimal scattering. As a result, seis-
mographic stations in Kazakhstan began as early as the 1960s to
acquire high-quality data from nuclear explosions, which occurred
somewhere around the world at a rate of approximately once a
week for the 30-year period from 1961 to 1990. The seismic data
(secret at that time in the Soviet Union) were used by the USSR
to monitor nuclear explosions carried out by the USA, France, the
UK, and China, using signals that propagated in the Earth for thou-
sands of kilometers from nuclear test sites used by these countries,
to the seismometer sites in Kazakhstan. Such signals are called
List of symbols, abbreviations, and acronyms
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory
BRV Borovoye (a small village in Northern Kazakhstan)
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
KOD The Russian abbreviation for the ﬁrst seismographic
system used at Borovoye
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LDEO Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia Univer-
sity
MAD Median Absolute Deviation
NZ Novaya Zemlya
NZTS Novaya Zemlya Test Site
PNEs Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (meaning a nuclear explo-
sion in the USSR conducted at a location other than a re-
cognized nuclear weapons test site)
SS An abbreviation for STsR-SS (see below), in turn the
Russian abbreviation for the second seismographic sys-
tem used at Borovoye
STS Semipalatinsk Test Site
STsR-SS A Russian abbreviation for the second seismographic
system used at Borovoye
STsR-TSG A Russian abbreviation for the third seismographic
system used at Borovoye
TSG An abbreviation for STsR-TSG (see above), in turn the
Russian abbreviation for the third seismographic system
used at Borovoye
UK United Kingdom
UNE Underground Nuclear Explosion
UNT Underground Nuclear Test
US or USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
142 V.A. An et al. / GeoResJ 6 (2015) 141–163teleseismic, and it is a testament to the detection capability of sta-
tions in Kazakhstan that they could reliably record teleseismic sig-
nals from distant explosions with yield down to about one kiloton
(about magnitude 4, using a scale based on teleseismic P-waves).
The monitoring facilities also recorded nuclear explosions carried
out by the USSR itself, many of them within Kazakhstan (for exam-
ple at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, the location of about 350 under-
ground nuclear explosions), using seismic signals that propagated
in many instances less than a thousand kilometers to the in-coun-
try recording sites. Such signals are called regional, and they can be
detected routinely even from explosions as small as about ten tons
(about magnitude 2.5, using a scale based on regional signals that
enables the assignment of magnitude for events too small the
characterize teleseismically). Borovoye data are important today,
primarily because they provide so many examples of the types of
regional signal needed to monitor for nuclear explosions down to
very low yield.
At several sites in Kazakhstan, operated by the Soviet Union in
the 1970s and 1980s, the seismic data were obtained with digital
recording systems. Seismic data can be recorded in analog form,
for example by pen on paper, or photographically. But digital
recording is much preferred over analog since digital data can
more readily be analyzed for their frequency content, and for sig-
nals of interest in the presence of other signals and noise. Digital
recording of seismic signals did not become widespread in western
countries until the 1970s, and there are no western archives of
digital data that document earthquakes and explosions prior to
1975 except for a limited number of seismic events in regions of
special study.
Nuclear weapons testing has occurred only at greatly reduced
levels since the mid-1990s. Moratoria on testing have been insti-
tuted by the USA, the Russian Federation, the UK, France, and
China, in the context of these nuclear weapon states all having
signed (and in some cases ratiﬁed) the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. Such moratoria will become an
actual ban on nuclear testing when the CTBT enters into force.
Kazakhstan still has an important role to play in seismic monitor-
ing for nuclear explosions, but the context is now arms control, and
monitoring to demonstrate the absence of nuclear explosions.
There is also the continuing need to monitor countries that are
not CTBT signatories and which may carry on with active programs
of nuclear testing. India and Pakistan carried out tests in May 1998;
the only country testing in the present century, to date, is North
Korea, which at this time of writing is known to have conducted
underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.Kazakhstan is superbly located for purposes of acquiring
teleseismic and regional seismic signals to monitor the territories
of China, Russia, and countries of South Asia (India and Pakistan)
plus Central Asia and the Middle East. The speciﬁc purpose of
explosion monitoring includes verifying compliance with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the CTBT. The extensive
growth in worldwide deployment of high-quality broadband seis-
mographic stations (there are now several thousand of them) took
place too late for the great majority of these stations to record
nuclear explosions. The Borovoye archive is thus important today
as a training set, especially useful for understanding the types of
regional seismic signals which travel in the Earth’s crust and
uppermost mantle, and that are needed to monitor for low yield
nuclear explosions.
In the USSR, one of the primary nuclear testing sites was in east-
ern Kazakhstan near the town of Semipalatinsk. At that time seis-
mology throughout much of Central Asia was heavily controlled by
scientists from the Ministry of Defense and Academy of Sciences of
the USSR. While there were well-established earthquake studies
programs in the most seismically active areas along the southern
border in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Tien Shan mountains of
southern Kazakhstan, most of the seismological observations in
central and northern Kazakhstan were focused on classiﬁed moni-
toring of the Soviet and foreign nuclear test sites.
In the mid 1980s, the Soviet government agreed to allow US
university groups to make seismological observations at temporary
locations surrounding the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in
Kazakhstan. This work was part of a program sponsored by the
US-based Natural Resources Defense Council and the Soviet
Academy of Sciences. An outgrowth of that program was an agree-
ment between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the
Incorporated Research Institutions in Seismology (a consortium
of US universities with graduate programs in seismology, often
called IRIS) to establish permanent seismographic observatories
throughout the USSR as part of the Global Seismographic
Network being developed by IRIS and the US Geological Survey.
Stations were established in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but
Kazakhstan remained closed for permanent observatories.
With the gradual opening of the USSR in the early 1990s, details
on extensive Soviet seismological facilities in Kazakhstan began to
emerge. In June 1991, Paul Richards of Columbia University and
Göran Ekström, then of Harvard University, visited the Borovoye
Geophysical Observatory, previously a secret operation, and were
introduced to the monitoring facilities and data archive there. In
1993, the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan was created and
Table 1
Borovoye Digital Archive for World-wide Underground Nuclear Tests, 1966–1996.
Country Test site Time period BRV data
USSR Semipalatinsk Test Site 1966 Dec 18–1989 Oct 19 228
Novaya Zemlya 1967 Oct 21–1990 Oct 24 31
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 1967 Oct 06–1988 Sep 06 80
China Lop Nor Test Site 1970 Sep 22–1995 May 15 11
France Tuamotu Archipelago 1977 Mar 19–1996 Jan 27 68
United Kingdom Nevada Test Site 1978 Apr 11–1989 Dec 08 15
United States Nevada Test Site 1967 May 23–1992 Mar 26 278
Total number of UNEs in the BRV archive 711
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V.A. An et al. / GeoResJ 6 (2015) 141–163 143given authority for many facilities, including that at Borovoye
(BRV), built in the Soviet era. For more than twenty years since
Borovoye facilities became open in 1991, a series of efforts were
made to rescue the signals contained in the digital archive at this
Observatory. The archive in the early 1990s consisted of thousands
of deteriorating digital magnetic tapes that could be read only on a
limited number of recording systems. With funding from a variety
of sources, the archive has been openly released in a modern for-
mat in two stages, and is now ﬁnding a variety of users.
Sections below give more details on: the Borovoye station and
associated interactions between scientists from Kazakhstan,
Russia, and the USA; the ﬁrst major release of digital recordings
of nuclear explosions from Borovoye, in April 2001; and the second
major data release, which incorporated a substantial effort to
deglitch the signals from nuclear explosions conducted in
Eurasia. This last release also provided detail on the responses of
the various seismometers and recording systems used at Borovoye.
We give examples of the signals recorded at Borovoye, and
comment on their utility.117˚ 00'W 116˚ 30'W 116˚ 00'W 115˚ 30'W
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Fig. 2. Locations of underground nuclear tests carried out by the United States and
jointly with United Kingdom at the Nevada Test Site (crosses). Most of these tests
were clustered at Pahute Mesa, Yucca Flat, and Rainier Mesa.2. The Borovoye seismographic station
Seismic recording in digital form began at Borovoye in 1966 as
described by An et al. [4] under the auspices of a ﬁeld program of
the USSR Academy of Sciences. High-quality seismic observations
continued to about 2008 when the Observatory grounds were
taken over by organizations planning hotels and a casino at this
site, which with its lake, rock formations, and local mountains
and forests, is scenically attractive.
Prior to 1991, Russian books and journals of geophysics pub-
lished detailed descriptions of seismometers and digital recording
systems operated at a site characterized as ‘‘experimental’’ and ‘‘in180˚
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available in April 2001.Northern Kazakhstan’’ or ‘‘in Eastern Kazakhstan.’’ Several articles
also appeared in western journals, authored by senior Russian seis-
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Fig. 3. Locations of underground nuclear tests carried out by France at the Tuamotu
Archipelago, French Polynesia. These tests are clustered into two areas: Mururoa
Atoll and Fangataufa Lagoon.
Table 2
Numbers of deglitched waveforms by region, as recorded by each of the three systems
(KOD, SS, TSG) at the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory from 1966 to 1995. Note that
some underground nuclear explosions are listed here as events that may have been
recorded by more than one instrument system. Table 3 through Table 8 list each event
in Eurasian test sites for which there is Borovoye data, and the systems that recorded
them.
Region System Events Traces Dates (yymmdd)
Balapan (Kazakhstan, KOD 7 51 680619–730723
Semipalatinsk SS 78 664 751029–891019
Test Site) TSG 73 575 741227–891019
Subtotal 158 1290
Degelen (Kazakhstan, KOD 45 290 670226–731026
Semipalatinsk SS 59 469 751213–891004
Test Site) TSG 59 382 741216–891004
Subtotal 163 1141
Murzhik (Kazakhstan, KOD 14 102 661218–730419
Semipalatinsk SS 4 34 760804–800404
Test Site) TSG 4 24 780319–800404
Subtotal 22 160
Novaya Zemlya KOD 9 68 671021–731027
(Russian Federation) SS 17 114 730927–901024
TSG 19 279 750823–901024
Subtotal 45 461
PNEs (Former Soviet Union) KOD 27 152 671006–731026
SS 38 259 730815–880906
TSG 28 157 760329–880906
Subtotal 93 568
Lop Nor (China) KOD 1 4 690922
SS 7 58 761017–900816
TSG 8 58 781014–950515
16 120
Total 497 3740
144 V.A. An et al. / GeoResJ 6 (2015) 141–163analysis (e.g., [9]), that were using signals from this same station,
later identiﬁed (e.g., [1]) as the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory.
Adushkin and An [2] state that the ‘‘. . .Borovoye station has been
used to test the majority of new Soviet instrumentation, including
various digital systems.’’
The digital data at Borovoye were mostly written on 35 mm
wide tapes and were stored at the Observatory. This original seis-
mogram archive holds data from one of the few digital seismo-
graphic stations operated anywhere in the world during the late
1960s and early 1970s, and provides unique data for the Central
Asia region for the whole 30-year period from commencement of
recording, up to the end of regular nuclear weapons testing by
the recognized nuclear weapons states in 1996. The archive is
invaluable for global seismological studies, due to its longevity of
homogeneous observation over more than 25 years, and the low-
noise conditions in northern Kazakhstan. Due to the cost of record-
ing tape, the archive is segmented rather than continuous, typicallyFig. 4. Locations (red stars) of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) recorded digitally
Northern Kazakhstan. More detailed maps are given as Figs. 5–8. (For interpretation of th
this article.)having a few hundred ﬁles per day from the various different chan-
nels as described further below.
There are about 8000 digital seismogram archive tapes. Each
magnetic tape has about 10 megabytes of digital seismogram data.
Digital data were recorded by three different Russian systems,
called KOD, STsR-SS, and STsR-TSG. Signals come from about
100,000 seismic events, which include earthquakes, industrial
and nuclear explosions, and industrial accidents. The archive also
contains some recordings from a former Soviet Army base near
Borovoye and digital data from seismographic stations in Centralby seismic monitoring systems at the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory (BRV) in
e references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
V.A. An et al. / GeoResJ 6 (2015) 141–163 145Asia—including Talgar (TLG), Bishkek (formerly Frunze, FRU) and
Naryn (NRN). Since underground nuclear explosions were carried
out in a wide variety of geological conditions as part of the
Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosion program, as well as at the
USSR’s nuclear weapons test sites, the BRVK archive of nuclear
explosion data is invaluable for purposes of research on CTBT
monitoring. Only with good data on explosions carried out in a
variety of environments, is it possible to accomplish a rational
design for an explosion monitoring network, and systematic meth-
ods of signal analysis.
The original wide tapes used as the archive medium have been
deteriorating for many years and it was realized that the signals
should be copied to more stable media, otherwise these valuable
seismic observations would be lost forever. In order to save the
digital seismogram archive at Borovoye and to make this valuable
data available to interested scientists worldwide, personnel at the
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia University, worked
with scientists at the National Nuclear Centre (NNC), Republic of
Kazakhstan, and at the Institute of Dynamics of the Geosphere
(IDG), Russian Academy of Sciences, beginning in the 1990s. It
was recognized that NNC, IDG and LDEO had to work closely
together, since the Borovoye Observatory had become a facility
of the NNC in Kazakhstan, but personnel of IDG were most familiar
with the content of the archive, and LDEO with IDG have designed
the necessary hardware and software systems for modernization.
Support for this work was provided in the early 1990s by the
Joint Seismic Program of the IRIS Consortium; in the period from
1997 to 2000 by the International Science and Technology77˚ 00'E 77˚ 30'E 78˚ 00'E
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Fig. 5. UNTs at Semipalatinsk Test Site (circles) recorded at Borovoye (BRV) durCentre, based in Moscow; and in the present century by the US
Air Force Research Laboratory.
A description of operations at Borovoye during its years as a
monitoring station has been reported as a feature article in EOS
(Transactions of the American Geophysical Union) by Richards
et al. [25] following a visit there by Richards and Ekström in
1991. Their article concluded that there was. . .
‘‘an interesting future for uses of data from Borovoye
Geophysical Observatory, but there are large problems. First,
there is the state of the archive, consisting of thousands of wide
tapes in deteriorating condition. They are written in a 17-track
format that is a barrier to modern systems. Only if the archive is
copied to a more stable recording medium, and is then re-for-
matted incorporating reliable information on instrument
responses, can its potential be realized. . . The archive is an
irreplaceable database on the seismicity of Central Asia, and
any serious attempt to work on the seismic hazard of
Kazakhstan and neighboring states must recognize the impor-
tance of preserving . . . the archive.
‘‘At the international level, the United States has a common
interest with Russia and Kazakhstan in preserving and
strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The technical chal-
lenge in monitoring treaty compliance into the future includes
the need to monitor for nuclear explosions in all possible types
of geological environment. The country with the greatest
experience in executing nuclear explosions under different
shot-point conditions is the former USSR, with its several78˚ 30'E 79˚ 00'E 79˚ 30'E
50 100 km
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ing 1966–1989. The Balapan, Degelen, and Murzhik regions are indicated.
146 V.A. An et al. / GeoResJ 6 (2015) 141–163nuclear weapons test sites and a program of ‘‘peaceful nuclear
explosions’’ carried out for various purposes at about one hun-
dred different locations across a wide range of geological
conditions. . .’’
This rationale for rescuing the Borovoye archive, with its infor-
mation on the signals from nuclear explosions carried out under a
variety of different conditions, has turned out to be sufﬁciently
persuasive that the work was eventually done, as reported in this
paper, though it took more than 20 years to execute.3. The ﬁrst release of borovoye data
The BRV digital archive of nuclear explosion waveforms from
711 underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) was originally made
available in April 2001 (for example, via http://www.ldeo.colum-
bia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Arch/BRV_arch_exp.html), as an out-
come of the International Science and Technology Center project
mentioned above, which provided 180 man-years of funding to
scientists and technicians in Kazakhstan and Russia for several dif-
ferent projects, of which the most time-consuming was saving the
Borovoye waveform archive. Table 1 gives basic information on
these 711 UNEs. Fig. 1 shows the location (BRV) of the Borovoye
Observatory, and the main nuclear test sites at which UNEs were
conducted and for which signals exist in the BRV archive.
The archive of nuclear explosion signals was issued as a series of
modern databases, described by Kim et al. [11], in a 41-page report54˚E 55
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Fig. 6. Locations of UNEs (red stars) at the Northern Novaya Zemlya Test Site recorded a
Northern Test Sites on Novaya Zemlya, and a great circle path between BRV and the NZavailable today via http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/Monitoring/
Data/Brv_arch_ex/brv_text_table.pdf. The archive was derived
from original Soviet-era magnetic tapes that in many cases were
in very bad condition, and for which only a limited number of tape
readers existed. The tapes were written in complicated formats
that had not been used even in the USSR for decades. For example,
many tapes had 24 channels of information written across 17 sepa-
rate tracks. The ﬁrst steps in salvaging the archive were reading all
the bits one last time from the original tapes using one of the few
available tape readers, and then writing them to a mid-1990s mass
store hard drive. Later steps entailed extraction of timing informa-
tion, de-multiplexing, and re-formatting.
Here, we may note that three different sets of Soviet-style
instruments and recording systems were deployed at BRV from
1966 to 1996. They are known as the KOD, STsR-SS, and STsR-
TSG systems (sometimes abbreviated to KO or KOD, SS, and TS or
TSG).
The ﬁrst BRV digital seismic system, KOD, began recording in
1966 and operated continuously from 1967 to 1973. It is based
on three-component, short-period seismometers, and is important
as one of the few digital seismic systems anywhere in the world in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The other Soviet-era BRV digital systems began operation in
February 1973. STsR-SS is intended mainly for low-gain recording.
STsR-TSG includes six long-period and seven short-period Kirnos
seismometers, most recorded at two gain levels, for a total
(SS + TS) of 20 data channels. The highest sensitivity is 100,000˚E 56˚E
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V.A. An et al. / GeoResJ 6 (2015) 141–163 147counts/micron based on a short-period Kirnos with a special
magnet and a low-noise ampliﬁer. This instrument was important
at BRV for teleseismic monitoring of numerous French and US
UNEs.
All of these main systems are approximately ﬂat to ground
displacement over a range of frequencies. Kim and Ekström
[10] have published details of the STsR-TSG instrumental system,
which has many channels, extending across almost 3 decades in
frequency. Information on the other two systems has not
previously been given in western scientiﬁc papers, and is given
below.
We note that numerous modern broadband sensors began to be
deployed at Borovoye once it opened to western scientists, the ﬁrst
of which was installed by Won-Young Kim in July 1994. These
modern sensors recorded the ﬁnal underground nuclear explosions
conducted by China, the May 1998 tests of India and Pakistan, and
the tests in this century by North Korea. They have also recorded
numerous earthquakes at regional distances. The station code
BRVK is used to represent Borovoye today.
During the cold war, when so many underground nuclear tests
were conducted (more than 1500), the signals recorded at
Borovoye were in the teleseismic range for explosions at the main
test sites used by the USA, the UK, and France. Fig. 2 shows the
location of USA and UK nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site (today,
called the Nevada National Security Site), for which there are
teleseismic signals in the Borovoye archive. Fig. 3 shows the loca-
tion of French nuclear tests in the South Paciﬁc, whose teleseismic
signals were recorded at BRV (via paths in this case that traversed
the Earth’s core).
Table 3
Deglitched Borovoye data for UNEs in the Balapan subarea of STS, 1968–1988.
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Latitude (N) Longitude (E) mb (P) Instrument type Comments
285 1968–06-19 05:05:59.8 49.98025 78.98550 5.28 KODB/M Bocharov
312 1969–11-30 03:32:59.7 49.92428 78.95575 6.02 KODB/M Bocharov
341 1971–06-30 03:56:59.8 49.94600 78.98047 4.94 KODB/M Bocharov
355 1972–02-10 05:03:00.0 50.02428 78.87808 5.27 KODB/M Bocharov
373 1972–11-02 01:27:00.2 49.92697 78.81725 6.16 KODB Bocharov
377 1972–12-10 04:27:10.0 50.02700 78.99556 5.96 KODB/M Bocharov/Double
382 1973–07-23 01:23:00.11 49.96889 78.81750 6.17 KODB/M AWE/NNC
416 1974–12-27 05:46:59.35 49.96583 79.00333 5.50 TSG AWE/NNC
433 1975–10-29 04:46:59.82 49.95389 78.87389 5.61 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
435 1975–12-25 05:16:59.65 50.04389 78.82000 5.69 TSG AWE/NNC
440 1976–04-21 05:02:59.70 49.90056 78.83083 5.12 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
443 1976–06-09 03:02:59.75 49.99361 79.02444 5.07 TSG AWE/NNC
444 1976–07-04 02:56:59.94 49.90417 78.89944 5.85 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
448 1976–08-28 02:56:59.99 49.97500 78.92639 5.74 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
453 1976–11-23 05:02:59.75 50.01306 78.94333 5.79 SS AWE/NNC
454 1976–12-07 04:56:59.85 49.94389 78.83917 5.80 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
460 1977–05-29 02:57:00.01 49.94639 78.77167 5.75 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
461 1977–06-29 03:07:00.35 49.99944 78.86667 5.20 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
468 1977–09-05 03:02:59.86 50.05556 78.91417 5.73 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
474 1977–10-29 03:07:04.92 50.05222 78.98028 5.56 SS/TSG AWE/NNC/Double
478 1977–11-30 04:06:59.85 49.96722 78.87444 5.89 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
487 1978–06-11 02:57:00.08 49.91333 78.80194 5.83 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
488 1978–07-05 02:46:59.97 49.90000 78.86667 5.77 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
496 1978–09-15 02:36:59.90 49.92833 78.86167 5.89 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
505 1978–11-04 05:05:59.81 50.04167 78.94722 5.56 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
506 1978–11-29 04:33:04.99 49.95333 78.79528 5.96 SS/TSG AWE/NNC/Double
514 1979–02-01 04:13:00.17 50.08083 78.85333 5.29 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
521 1979–06-23 02:57:00.02 49.91472 78.84583 6.16 TSG AWE/NNC
522 1979–07-07 03:46:59.81 50.03306 78.98917 5.84 SS AWE/NNC
526 1979–08-04 03:56:59.97 49.90306 78.88778 6.13 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
528 1979–08-18 02:51:59.61 49.94806 78.91889 6.13 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
538 1979–10-28 03:16:59.45 49.99667 78.99500 5.98 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
540 1979–12-02 04:36:59.95 49.90944 78.78444 5.99 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
542 1979–12-23 04:56:59.93 49.93222 78.75278 6.13 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
546 1980–04-25 03:57:00.03 49.97639 78.75944 5.45 SS AWE/NNC
548 1980–06-12 03:27:00.11 49.98872 78.99108 5.52 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
552 1980–06-29 02:33:00.19 49.94861 78.81806 5.69 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
554 1980–09-14 02:42:41.63 49.93667 78.79750 6.21 SS AWE/NNC
558 1980–10-12 03:34:16.58 49.96750 79.02250 5.88 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
564 1980–12-14 03:47:08.91 49.90889 78.91861 5.93 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
566 1980–12-27 04:09:10.56 50.06194 78.97528 5.87 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
568 1981–03-29 04:03:52.51 50.01806 78.97881 5.49 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
569 1981–04-22 01:17:13.82 49.89889 78.80861 5.94 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
571 1981–05-27 03:58:14.82 49.98694 78.97056 5.30 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
577 1981–09-13 02:17:20.76 49.91333 78.89444 6.06 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
582 1981–10-18 03:57:05.14 49.92806 78.84472 6.00 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
585 1981–11-29 03:35:11.11 49.90194 78.84889 5.62 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
587 1981–12-27 03:43:16.62 49.93306 78.77833 6.16 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
589 1982–04-25 03:23:07.88 49.91694 78.88778 6.03 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
591 1982–07-04 01:17:16.65 49.95861 78.81167 6.08 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
594 1982–08-31 01:31:03.17 49.91417 78.76139 5.20 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
604 1982–12-05 03:37:15.04 49.93083 78.80972 6.08 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
606 1982–12-26 03:35:16.68 50.06306 78.99389 5.58 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
611 1983–06-12 02:36:46.01 49.92500 78.89806 6.02 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
625 1983–10-06 01:47:09.08 49.92458 78.75069 5.95 SS AWE/NNC
626 1983–10-26 01:55:07.33 49.91250 78.82167 6.04 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
628 1983–11-20 03:27:06.86 50.05083 78.99917 5.33 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
632 1984–02-19 03:57:05.85 49.89611 78.74306 5.77 SS AWE/NNC
633 1984–03-07 02:39:08.80 50.05000 78.95611 5.56 SS AWE/NNC
634 1984–03-29 05:19:10.66 49.91111 78.92694 5.86 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
636 1984–04-25 01:09:05.99 49.93583 78.85056 5.90 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
637 1984–05-26 03:13:14.85 49.97889 79.00556 6.01 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
638 1984–07-14 01:09:12.99 49.90944 78.87722 6.10 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
654 1984–10-27 01:50:12.93 49.93472 78.92806 6.19 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
656 1984–12-02 03:19:08.85 50.00611 79.00889 5.77 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
657 1984–12-16 03:55:05.07 49.94583 78.80861 6.12 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
658 1984–12-28 03:50:13.09 49.88028 78.70389 6.00 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
659 1985–02-10 03:27:09.98 49.89917 78.78056 5.83 SS AWE/NNC
660 1985–04-25 00:57:08.97 49.92667 78.88083 5.84 SS AWE/NNC
661 1985–06-15 00:57:03.25 49.90861 78.84278 6.05 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
663 1985–06-30 02:39:05.26 49.86444 78.66861 5.92 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
667 1985–07-20 00:53:16.91 49.94972 78.78389 5.89 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
670 1987–03-12 01:57:19.57 49.93528 78.82889 5.31 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
671 1987–04-03 01:17:10.28 49.91806 78.78028 6.12 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
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Table 3 (continued)
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Latitude (N) Longitude (E) mb (P) Instrument type Comments
673 1987–04-17 01:03:07.09 49.87778 78.66889 5.92 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
678 1987–06-20 00:53:07.09 49.93528 78.74417 6.03 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
683 1987–08-02 00:58:09.27 49.88056 78.87472 5.83 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
688 1987–11-15 03:31:09.08 49.89861 78.75806 5.98 SS AWE/NNC
689 1987–12-13 03:21:07.31 49.96306 78.79306 6.06 SS IDG/NNC
691 1987–12-27 03:05:07.00 49.87944 78.72500 6.00 SS IDG/NNC
693 1988–02-13 03:05:08.327 49.93667 78.86389 5.97 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
694 1988–04-03 01:33:08.294 49.90833 78.90833 5.99 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
696 1988–05-04 00:57:09.261 49.94944 78.75028 6.09 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
698 1988–06-14 02:27:08.98 50.01889 78.96056 4.80 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
701 1988–09-14 03:59:59.69 49.87778 78.82306 6.03 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
703 1988–11-12 03:30:06.26 50.04306 78.96889 5.24 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
706 1988–12-17 04:18:09.291 49.88194 78.92472 5.83 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
708 1989–01-22 03:57:09.02 49.93944 78.81944 6.10 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
709 1989–02-12 04:15:09.342 49.91861 78.71111 5.86 SS/TSG IDG/NNC
711 1989–07-08 03:47:00.03 49.86778 78.78028 5.55 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
712 1989–09-02 04:16:59.85 50.00583 78.98556 4.94 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
714 1989–10-19 09:49:59.81 49.92222 78.90833 5.86 SS/TSG AWE/NNC
Notes on Table 3.
Test No. = unique test number given in Mikhailov et al. [20] for 715 nuclear tests in USSR.
mb(P) = teleseismic body-wave magnitude from Marshall et al. [18].
Bocharov = ground truth data from Bocharov et al. [6].
NNC = ground truth location reported by the National Nuclear Center [21].
AWE = origin time from Lilwall and Farthing [17].
Doubl = double test (preceded or followed by another test at Degelen within a few seconds).
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UNEs recorded at regional distances. Such signals are typically
more complicated that those recorded teleseismically, but they
are important to understand in view of the fact that they can
enable monitoring to be carried out for UNEs of lower magnitude.
Therefore, special efforts have been made, as we next describe, to
improve the usability of Borovoye recordings made from nuclear
tests conducted in Eurasia, many of which were at regional dis-
tances from the Observatory.4. The second release of Borovoye data
The Borovoye archive made available to researchers in 2001 had
two substantial defects, both of which have been corrected in the
second major data release, which focuses on the signals from
underground nuclear explosions in Eurasia. First, the digital data
for some signals suffered from a signiﬁcant number of glitches,
and it was left to the user to decide how to manage them.
Second, information on the instrument responses of the numerous
different recording channels was incomplete, thus preventing
much of the archive from being used for spectral analysis or for
applications requiring knowledge of absolute ground motion
derived from the recordings.
Issuance of the archive in 2001 promoted efforts at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to remove the glitches, and
scientiﬁc results based upon the deglitched records, for those
recordings for which the instrument responses were known, found
many uses. Consequently a new project was initiated, with the
intent to complete work on deglitching and instrument responses.
This work has now been concluded, and the deglitched waveforms
are available at http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/
Arch/BRV_arch_deglitched.html.
Fig. 4 shows the location of Borovoye, and of the hundreds of
nuclear explosions in Eurasia recorded by the Observatory. In
many cases these recordings were made at regional distances,
and thus include seismic signals known as Pn, Pg, Sn, and Lg, which
have traveled mainly in the Earth’s crust and uppermost mantle
rather than at greater depths in the Earth’s interior. Table 2summarizes the numbers of recorded explosions in Eurasia and
the numbers of recordings (traces) associated with six different
groups of explosions, namely the Balapan, Degelen, and Murzhik
sub-regions of the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan; the
Novaya Zemlya Test Site in Russia; the wide-ranging locations of
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) conducted by the Soviet
Union; and the Lop Nor Test Site in China.
Fig. 5 through Fig. 8 show the locations of underground
nuclear explosions, for which deglitched data are now available,
in four different groupings, namely: the Semipalatinsk Test Site
(Fig. 5); the Novaya Zemlya Test Site (Fig. 6); the Soviet
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (Fig. 7); and the Lop Nor Test Site
in China (Fig. 8).
Tables 3–5, list information for these explosions at the sub-re-
gions Balapan, Degelen, and Murzhik (respectively) for the
Semipalatinsk Test Site. Tables 6–8, give explosion details for
Novaya Zemlya, Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, and Lop Nor
(China). In these Tables, the precision of the seismically deter-
mined origin times are indicated by their decimal points. The col-
umn headed ‘‘Instrument type’’ speciﬁes the instrument used, and
KODB = KOD high-gain system; KODM = KOD low-gain system;
SS = STsR-SS system; TSG = STsR-TSG system (see Kim and
Ekström, 1996);5. Deglitching and deriving instrument responses
Following the ﬁrst release of Borovoye data in April 2001, per-
sonnel at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) became familiar
with the BRV archive. They processed approximately one third of
it to remove glitches, using the results of Kim and Ekström [10]
to correct for instrument response for the TSG recording system
in use at BRV, and used the resulting corrected waveforms in a
variety of practical studies to improve nuclear explosion monitor-
ing in Central Asia and the surrounding regions.
These corrected waveforms were used for regional seismic dis-
crimination studies, coda wave magnitude studies, and regionalMs
studies, primarily using the STsR-TSG or TS instrumentation. LANL
personnel also used a limited subset of the earlier KOD and STsR-SS
Table 4
Deglitched Borovoye data for UNEs in the Degelen subarea of STS, 1967–1989.
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Latitude (N) Longitude (E) mb (P) Instrument type Comments
264 1967–02-26 03:57:59.8 49.74569 78.08231 6.03 KODB Bocharov
266 1967–04-20 04:08:01.0 49.74161 78.10542 5.56 KODB Bocharov
267 1967–05-28 04:07:59.6 49.75642 78.01689 5.46 KODB Bocharov
268 1967–06-29 02:56:59.9 49.81669 78.04903 5.34 KODB/M Bocharov
269 1967–07-15 03:26:59.9 49.83592 78.11817 5.39 KODB Bocharov
270 1967–08-04 06:58:00.3 49.76028 78.05550 5.32 KODB/M Bocharov
271 1967–09-02 04:04:00.0 49.74194 78.02556 4.10 KODB Khalturin
275 1967–10-17 05:04:00.2 49.78089 78.00383 5.63 KODB/M Bocharov
277 1967–10-30 06:04:00.0 49.79436 78.00786 5.41 KODB/M Bocharov
279 1967–12-08 06:03:59.8 49.81714 78.16378 5.31 KODB Bocharov
280 1968–01-07 03:46:59.9 49.75442 78.03094 4.98 KODB Bocharov
281 1968–04-24 10:35:59.7 49.84519 78.10322 4.91 KODB Bocharov
284 1968–06-11 03:05:59.7 49.79300 78.14508 5.24 KODB/M Bocharov
294 1968–11-09 02:54:00.1 49.80053 78.13911 4.75 KODB Bocharov
296 1968–12-18 05:01:59.7 49.74594 78.09203 5.04 KODB/M Bocharov
297 1969–03-07 08:26:59.8 49.82147 78.06267 5.66 KODB/M Bocharov
300 1969–05-16 04:02:59.7 49.75942 78.07578 5.26 KODB/M Bocharov
302 1969–07-04 02:46:59.6 49.74603 78.11133 5.24 KODB/M Bocharov
303 1969–07-23 02:47:00.2 49.81564 78.12961 5.50 KODB/M Bocharov
306 1969–09-11 04:02:00.0 49.77631 77.99669 4.91 KODB/M Bocharov
308 1969–10-01 04:02:59.9 49.78250 78.09831 5.26 KODB/M Bocharov
315 1969–12-29 04:02:00.0 49.73367 78.10225 4.22 KODB Bocharov
316 1970–01-29 07:03:00.0 49.79558 78.12389 5.60 KODB/M Bocharov
318 1970–03-27 05:02:59.6 49.74781 77.99897 4.93 KODB/M Bocharov
319 1970–05-27 04:03:00.0 49.73131 78.09861 4.20 KODB Bocharov
321 1970–06-28 01:58:00.0 49.80150 78.10681 5.87 KODB/M Bocharov
324 1970–07-24 03:57:00.0 49.80972 78.12839 5.34 KODB/M Bocharov
326 1970–09-06 04:02:59.9 49.78889 77.99750 5.53 KODB/M Bocharov
330 1970–12-17 07:01:00.0 49.74564 78.09917 5.43 KODB/M Bocharov
332 1971–01-29 05:03:00.0 49.80528 78.16861 4.47 KODB Khalturin
333 1971–03-22 04:33:00.3 49.79847 78.10897 5.77 KODB/M Bocharov
337 1971–04-25 03:32:59.9 49.76853 78.03392 6.08 KODB/M Bocharov
338 1971–05-25 04:03:00.4 49.80164 78.13883 5.05 KODB/M Bocharov
350 1971–11-29 06:02:59.9 49.74342 78.07850 5.46 KODB/M Bocharov
351 1971–12-15 07:52:59.8 49.82639 77.99731 4.90 KODB Bocharov
353 1971–12-30 06:21:00.2 49.74917 78.00611 5.84 KODB/M Bocharov
356 1972–03-10 04:56:59.8 49.74531 78.11969 5.45 KODM Bocharov
357 1972–03-28 04:22:00.1 49.73306 78.07569 5.18 KODB/M Bocharov
360 1972–06-07 01:28:00.0 49.82675 78.11547 5.42 KODB/M Bocharov
365 1972–08-16 03:16:59.8 49.76547 78.05883 5.11 KODB/M Bocharov
376 1972–12-10 04:27:00.0 49.81939 78.05822 5.72 KODB/M Bocharov/Double
378 1972–12-28 04:27:00.0 49.73919 78.10625 4.60 KODB Bocharov
379 1973–02-16 05:03:00.0 49.81583 78.10667 5.48 KODB/M AWE/Leith
381 1973–07-10 01:27:00.15 49.79111 78.01278 5.34 KODB AWE/Leith
391 1973–10-26 04:27:00.14 49.75222 78.13250 5.23 KODB/M AWE/Leith
414 1974–12-16 06:23:00.14 49.76778 78.08167 4.94 TSG AWE/Leith
415 1974–12-16 06:41:00.34 49.83306 78.02667 4.89 TSG AWE/Leith
434 1975–12-13 04:56:59.99 49.81333 78.10861 5.00 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
436 1976–01-15 04:46:59.97 49.81000 78.17139 5.18 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
441 1976–04-21 04:58:00.16 49.75472 78.10750 4.94 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
442 1976–05-19 02:57:00.2 49.77750 78.01556 4.72 SS AWE/Leith
445 1976–07-23 02:33:00.19 49.74333 78.05167 4.96 SS AWE/Leith
451 1976–10-30 04:57:00.21 49.83139 78.05722 4.62 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
456 1976–12-30 03:57:00.31 49.78028 78.03667 5.09 TSG AWE/Leith
457 1977–03-29 03:56:59.95 49.77639 78.01750 5.41 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
459 1977–04-25 04:07:00.16 49.81333 78.10861 5.07 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
463 1977–07-30 01:57:00.11 49.75056 78.04917 5.13 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
465 1977–08-17 04:26:59.97 49.83083 78.11389 5.01 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
479 1977–12-26 04:03:00.24 49.81083 78.05417 4.91 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
482 1978–03-26 03:56:59.96 49.76194 77.98250 5.69 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
483 1978–04-22 03:07:00.01 49.75167 78.13167 5.35 TSG AWE/Leith
485 1978–05-29 04:56:59.85 49.79139 78.09444 4.68 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
489 1978–07-28 02:46:59.89 49.75500 78.14500 5.75 TSG AWE/Leith
493 1978–08-29 02:36:59.95 49.81333 78.10861 5.20 SS AWE/Leith/Double
501 1978–10-15 05:37:00.14 49.73667 78.11111 5.15 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
504 1978–10-31 04:17:00.19 49.78861 78.10750 5.25 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
509 1978–12-14 04:43:00.03 49.81583 78.10667 4.74 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
511 1978–12-20 04:33:00.04 49.81083 78.05417 4.71 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
518 1979–05-06 03:17:00.07 49.76194 77.98250 5.22 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
519 1979–05-31 05:55:00.05 49.81278 78.05944 5.27 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
532 1979–09-27 04:13:00.00 49.75056 78.04917 4.42 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
535 1979–10-18 04:17:00.11 49.82417 78.09750 5.23 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
539 1979–11-30 04:53:00.58 49.78306 78.08667 4.42 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
541 1979–12-21 04:42:00.09 49.79222 78.11300 4.71 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
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Table 4 (continued)
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Latitude (N) Longitude (E) mb (P) Instrument type Comments
545 1980–04-10 04:07:00.19 49.78250 78.05722 4.98 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
547 1980–05-22 03:57:00.14 49.77972 78.03639 5.53 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
553 1980–07-31 03:33:00.07 49.79056 78.09083 5.33 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
555 1980–09-25 06:21:13.06 49.78333 78.08056 4.83 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
573 1981–06-30 01:57:15.34 49.76750 78.08083 5.16 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
574 1981–07-17 02:37:18.12 49.80139 78.13139 5.07 TSG AWE/Leith
575 1981–08-14 02:27:15.24 49.75222 78.05306 4.88 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
584 1981–11-20 04:57:05.07 49.73667 78.10417 5.00 SS AWE/Leith
586 1981–12-22 04:31:05.27 49.83417 78.08028 4.96 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
588 1982–02-19 03:56:13.42 49.82333 78.03333 5.40 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
590 1982–06-25 02:03:07.16 49.77139 78.11083 4.57 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
593 1982–08-23 02:43:06.70 49.74028 78.03083 4.44 SS AWE/Leith
596 1982–09-21 02:57:03.17 49.77917 78.12472 5.15 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
605 1982–12-25 04:23:08.38 49.78111 78.03500 4.47 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
608 1983–03-30 04:17:10.22 49.78500 78.04056 4.61 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
609 1983–04-12 03:41:08.26 49.78556 78.08472 4.65 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
610 1983–05-30 03:33:47.04 49.74111 78.12028 5.43 SS AWE/Leith
612 1983–06-24 02:56:13.85 49.73972 78.03583 4.46 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
617 1983–09-11 06:33:13.10 49.78472 78.08417 4.48 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
629 1983–11-29 02:19:08.80 49.73028 78.09583 5.31 SS AWE/Leith
631 1983–12-26 04:29:09.25 49.79000 78.10917 5.48 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
635 1984–04-15 03:17:11.46 49.76056 78.08917 5.72 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
648 1984–09-09 02:59:08.85 49.80444 78.08750 4.89 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
650 1984–10-18 04:57:08.32 49.72944 78.08639 4.25 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
655 1984–11-23 03:55:07.48 49.81250 78.05944 4.38 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
668 1985–07-25 03:11:09.23 49.81917 78.14944 4.82 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
669 1987–02-26 04:58:24.32 49.83417 78.08111 5.40 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
676 1987–05-06 04:02:08.11 49.77583 78.01222 5.60 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
677 1987–06-06 02:37:09.25 49.83667 78.06167 5.40 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
680 1987–07-17 01:17:09.18 49.77583 78.01972 5.80 SS AWE/Leith
685 1987–09-18 02:32:10.01 49.80444 78.08750 4.30 SS AWE/Leith
687 1987–10-16 06:06:06.99 49.72972 78.08667 4.60 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
690 1987–12-20 02:55:09.14 49.77583 78.01222 4.80 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
692 1988–02-06 04:19:09.13 49.77583 78.01972 4.70 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
695 1988–04-22 09:30:09.44 49.79028 78.10694 4.90 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
702 1988–10-18 03:40:09.16 49.78000 78.01722 4.90 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
704 1988–11-23 03:57:08.99 49.77944 78.03722 5.40 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
707 1988–12-28 05:28:10 49.80111 78.06861 3.74 SS/TSG Khalturin/Leith
710 1989–02-17 04:01:09.22 49.82778 78.05972 5.00 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
713 1989–10-04 11:30:00.16 49.74833 78.00944 4.60 SS/TSG AWE/Leith
Notes on Table 4.
Test no. = unique test number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) for 715 nuclear tests in USSR.
mb(P) = teleseismic body-wave magnitude from Marshall et al. [18] and Ringdal et al. [26].
Bocharov = ground truth data from Bocharov et al. [6].
Leith = ground truth location from Leith [16] for entrance to the tunnels.
AWE = origin time from Lilwall and Farthing [17].
Khalturin = location and origin time from Khalturin et al. [15].
Doubl = double test (preceded or followed by another test at Balapan within a few seconds.
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to use discriminants based on ratios of different frequency bands
as the archive did not then contain response information for those
earlier systems (KOD, SS).
A coordinated effort was therefore begun in 2007, by personnel
at Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory and LANL, to remove
glitches and to incorporate instrument response information for
the KOD and SS systems as well as for TSG, and thus to access infor-
mation from all channels of Borovoye data, for underground
nuclear explosions conducted in Eurasia.
5.1. Technical approach to deglitching
When the BRV archive was made generally available in 2001,
the decision was made that it be essentially in its original unpro-
cessed form (though with the addition of basic header informa-
tion), but converted to a modern and widely use format for
digital seismic data (namely, CSS3.0). The original Soviet-era
recordings had some severe problems, most notoriously that the
digitizer typically did not write a count value on seismic waveform
channels at the time when the time channel was writing themarker for an integer second. The waveform data therefore ended
up with glitches, which could be numerous in some recordings of
ground motion. The original recording system addressed the prac-
tical problem of input signals having wide dynamic range, by hav-
ing several different channels set at different gain levels, each
recording with a limited number of bits (often, only 11 bits), so
that although each UNE was usually recorded on several channels,
in practice these channels were often either clipped or had inade-
quate resolution.
Despite these defects, ways to extract the underlying informa-
tion have been found. For example, empirical travel-time informa-
tion, needed to generate Source Speciﬁc Station Corrections for the
BRV station (which today is part of the International Monitoring
System headquartered in Vienna) can be obtained by picking ﬁrst
and secondary arrivals from a high-gain channel. But the spectrum
of the strongest ground motion is often best obtained from one of
the lower-gain channels. Coda can be measured from both high-
gain and low-gain channels.
Raw waveforms of the Borovoye archive are contaminated with
glitches on all seismometer channels and their different gain levels,
for the entire time period that data are available. Many glitches are
Table 5
Deglitched Borovoye data for UNEs in the Murzhik subarea of STS, 1967–1980.
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Latitude (N) Longitude (E) mb (P) Instrument type Comments
262 1966–12-18 04:58:00.0 49.92458 77.74722 5.92 KODB Bocharov
272 1967–09-16 04:04:00.3 49.93719 77.72811 5.25 KODB/M Bocharov
273 1967–09-22 05:04:00.0 49.95964 77.69106 5.16 KODB Bocharov
278 1967–11-22 04:03:59.9 49.94194 77.68683 4.41 KODB Bocharov
301 1969–05-31 05:01:59.4 49.95031 77.69422 5.29 KODB/M Bocharov
314 1969–12-28 03:47:00.2 49.93733 77.71422 5.79 KODB/M Bocharov
323 1970–07-21 03:02:59.7 49.95242 77.67289 5.38 KODB/M Bocharov
328 1970–11-04 06:02:59.8 49.98922 77.76244 5.44 KODB/M Bocharov
339 1971–06-06 04:02:59.7 49.97542 77.66028 5.53 KODB/M Bocharov
340 1971–06-19 04:04:00.1 49.96903 77.64081 5.54 KODB/M Bocharov
347 1971–10-09 06:02:59.7 49.97789 77.64144 5.37 KODB/M Bocharov
348 1971–10-21 06:02:59.7 49.97381 77.59733 5.58 KODB/M Bocharov
367 1972–08-26 03:46:59.7 49.98197 77.71661 5.36 KODB/M Bocharov
380 1973–04-19 04:32:59.92 49.984 77.614 5.36 KODB/M AWE
447 1976–08-04 02:57:00 49.87 77.70 4.20 SS Khalturin
481 1978–03-19 03:46:59.82 49.945 77.704 5.19 SS/TSG AWE
515 1979–02-16 04:04:00.50 49.974 77.668 5.39 SS/TSG AWE
524 1979–07-18 03:17:04.92 49.919 77.812 5.16 SS/TSG AWE
544 1980–04-04 05:32:59.83 50.000 77.823 4.90 SS/TSG AWE
Notes on Table 5.
Test no. = unique test number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) for 715 nuclear tests in USSR.
mb(P) = teleseismic body-wave magnitude from Marshall et al. [18] and Ringdal et al. [26].
Bocharov = ground truth data from Bocharov et al. [6].
AWE = origin time from Lilwall and Farthing [17].
Khalturin = location and origin time from Khalturin et al. [15].
Table 6
Deglitched Borovoye data for UNEs at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site, 1967–1990.
Test no. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Lat. (N) Long. (E) mb (P) Inst. type Comments
276 1967–10-21 04:59:58.49 73.390 54.810 5.98 KODB/M Salvo exp. in two tunnels
293 1968–11-07 10:02:05.49 73.387 54.858 6.13 KODB/M Salvo exp. in single tunnel
309 1969–10-14 07:00:06.61 73.390 54.787 6.18 KODB/M 3 Explosions
327 1970–10-14 05:59:57.57 73.304 55.027 6.79 KODB/M 3 Explosions 150–1500 kt
345 1971–09-27 05:59:55.75 73.393 54.920 6.67 KODB/M 4 Explosions 150–1500 kt
368 1972–08-28 05:59:56.87 73.388 54.847 6.49 KODB/M 4 Explosions
385 1973–09-12 06:59:54.81 73.314 55.056 6.97 KODB/M Highest yield Soviet UNT
388 1973–09-27 07:00:01.12 70.731 53.827 5.89 KODB/SS Southern Test Site
392 1973–10-27 07:00:00.61 70.780 54.026 6.98 KODB/M/SS Southern Test Site
427 1975–08-23 08:59:58.25 73.334 54.682 6.55 TSG Salvo exp. with 8 explosions
430 1975–10-18 08:59:59.40 70.816 53.744 6.75 TSG 2 expls. shaft Yu-6 N
431 1975–10-18 Single explosion in shaft Yu-7 simultaneously with test #430 both Southern Test Site
432 1975–10-21 11:59:58.03 73.307 55.010 6.60 SS/TSG 5 Explosions
449 1976–09-29 02:59:57.70 73.360 54.871 5.83 SS/TSG 2 expls. reference for JED
450 1976–10-20 07:59:58.07 73.398 54.812 4.98 SS/TSG 4 Explosions
467 1977–09-01 02:59:57.97 73.339 54.619 5.66 TSG 4 Explosions
471 1977–10-09 10:59:58.12 73.409 54.927 4.36 SS/TSG Single explosion 0.001–20 kt
491 1978–08-10 07:59:57.93 73.291 54.883 6.00 SS/TSG 6 Explosions
499 1978–09-27 02:04:58.60 73.349 54.676 5.63 SS/TSG 7 Explosions
531 1979–09-24 03:29:59.75 73.343 54.672 5.77 TSG 3 Explosions
536 1979–10-18 07:09:58.75 73.316 54.816 5.79 SS/TSG 4 Explosions
557 1980–10-11 07:09:57.47 73.336 54.940 5.76 SS 7 Explosions
580 1981–10-01 12:14:57.23 73.304 54.818 5.97 TSG 4 Explosions
599 1982–10-11 07:14:58.63 73.339 54.608 5.58 TSG 4 Explosions
616 1983–08-18 16:09:58.90 73.354 54.974 5.91 SS 5 Explosions
624 1983–09-25 13:09:58.22 73.328 54.541 5.77 SS/TSG 4 Explosions
651 1984–10-25 06:29:58.12 73.355 54.990 5.82 SS/TSG 4 Explosions
682 1987–08-02 02:00:00.20 73.326 54.602 5.82 SS/TSG 5 Explosions
697 1988–05-07 22:49:58.34 73.314 54.553 5.58 SS/TSG 3 Explosions
705 1988–12-04 05:19:53.30 73.366 55.001 5.89 SS/TSG 5 Explosions
715 1990–10-24 14:57:58.45 73.331 54.757 5.70 SS/TSG 8 expls. last Soviet test
Notes on Table 6.
Test no. = unique test id number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) for nuclear tests in USSR; mb(P), from Marshall et al. [19]; location and origin time from Marshall et al. [19]
and Richards [22].
salvo exp. (salvo explosion) means two or more separate explosions where a period of time between successive individual explosions does not exceed 5 s and where the
burial points of all explosive devices can be connected by segments of straight lines, each of them connecting two burial points and does not exceed 40 km in length.
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Table 7
Deglitched Borovoye data for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the Former Soviet Union, 1967–1988.
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Lat. (N) Long. (E) Depth (m) mb (P) Distance () Az () Instrument type
274 1967–10-06 06:59:57.5 57.70 65.20 172 4.7 5.46 330.2 KODB
282 1968–05-21 03:59:11.98 38.918 65.032 2440 5.4 14.59 196.4 KODB
304 1969–09-02 04:59:58.61 57.220 55.393 1212 4.8 9.45 302.1 KODB
305 1969–09-08 04:59:58.70 57.220 55.417 1208 4.8 9.44 302.1 KOD
307 1969–09-26 06:59:58.14 45.848 42.600 712 5.6 19.23 259.2 KOD
313 1969–12-06 07:02:59.85 43.867 54.800 407 5.8 13.73 234.2 KOD
320 1970–06-25 04:59:55.5 52.20 55.70 702 4.9 8.88 270.3 KODB
329 1970–12-12 07:00:59.83 43.85 54.80 497 6.0 13.74 234.2 KOD
331 1970–12-23 07:00:59.76 44.025 54.933 470 6.0 13.55 234.3 KOD
335 1971–03-23 06:59:58.38 61.40 56.20 127 5.5 11.25 323.4 KOD
342 1971–07-02 17:00:01.13 67.283 63.467 542 4.7 14.60 349.5 KODB
344 1971–09-19 11:00:01.08 57.508 42.643 610 4.5 16.23 296.9 KODB
346 1971–10-04 10:00:00.14 61.358 48.092 595 4.6 14.49 313.6 KODB
352 1971–12-22 06:59:59.0 47.897 48.133 986 6.0 14.94 258.7 KOD
358 1972–04-11 06:00:01.92 37.35 62.05 1720 4.9 16.72 203.3 KODB
363 1972–07-09 07:00:01.25 49.80 35.40 2483 4.8 21.77 275.6 KODB
366 1972–08-20 03:00:00.01 49.400 48.142 489 5.7 14.28 264.1 KOD
370 1972–09-04 07:00:00 67.75 33.10 131 4.6 22.92 324.0 KODB
371 1972–09-21 09:00:00.31 52.118 52.068 485 5.0 11.08 272.4 KODB
372 1972–10-03 09:00:00.18 46.853 44.938 485 5.6 17.34 259.3 KODB
375 1972–11-24 09:00:00.04 51.990 51.867 675 4.5 11.22 271.9 KODB
383 1973–08-15 02:00:00.02 42.775 67.408 600 5.3 10.46 191.7 KOD/SS
384 1973–08-28 03:00:00.04 50.527 68.323 395 5.2 2.81 206.4 KOD/SS
386 1973–09-19 03:00:00.18 45.758 67.825 615 5.1 7.47 193.3 KOD/SS
389 1973–09-30 05:00:00.35 51.65 54.55 1145 5.2 9.69 268.0 KODB
390 1973–10-26 05:59:59.5 53.65 55.40 2026 4.8 8.89 279.8 KODB
406 1974–08-29 15:00:00.39 67.085 62.625 583 5.0 14.51 348.1 SS
428 1975–09-29 11:00:00.43 69.578 90.337 834 4.8 18.91 21.7 SS
438 1976–03-29 07:00:00.23 47.897 48.133 986 4.3 14.94 258.7 SS/TSG
446 1976–07-29 05:00:00.5 47.870 48.150 1000 5.9 14.94 258.6 SS/TSG
452 1976–11-05 03:59:59.98 61.458 112.860 1522 5.3 24.00 52.6 SS
462 1977–07-26 17:00:00.22 69.575 90.375 850 5.0 18.92 21.7 SS/TSG
466 1977–08-20 22:00:00.78 64.108 99.558 600 5.0 18.57 42.1 TSG
469 1977–09-10 16:00:00.18 57.251 106.551 550 4.8 20.88 63.9 SS/TSG
470 1977–09-30 06:59:58.43 47.897 48.161 1500 5.0 14.92 258.7 SS
490 1978–08-09 18:00:00.79 63.678 125.522 567 5.6 29.74 47.3 SS
492 1978–08-24 18:00:00.35 65.925 112.338 577 5.1 24.25 41.7 SS/TSG
498 1978–09-21 15:00:00.19 66.598 86.210 886 5.2 15.62 23.9 SS/TSG
500 1978–10-08 00:00:00.0 61.55 112.85 1545 5.2 23.99 52.4 SS
502 1978–10-17 04:59:59.06 47.850 48.120 1040 5.8 14.97 258.6 SS
503 1978–10-17 14:00:00.16 63.185 63.432 593 5.5 10.74 343.2 SS
510 1978–12-18 07:59:58.5 47.860 48.160 630 5.9 14.94 258.6 SS/TSG
513 1979–01-17 07:59:58.5 47.920 48.120 995 6.0 14.93 258.8 SS/TSG
523 1979–07-14 04:59:58.0 47.880 48.120 849 5.6 14.95 258.7 SS/TSG
527 1979–08-12 18:00:00.21 61.803 122.430 982 4.9 28.52 51.4 SS/TSG
529 1979–09-06 18:00:00.31 64.110 99.562 599 4.9 18.57 42.1 SS/TSG
533 1979–10-04 16:00:00.03 60.675 71.455 837 5.4 7.64 4.3 SS/TSG
534 1979–10-07 21:00:00.22 61.85 113.10 1545 5.0 24.12 51.7 SS/TSG
537 1979–10-24 05:59:59.0 47.850 48.140 915 5.8 14.96 258.6 SS/TSG
556 1980–10-08 06:00:00.29 46.757 48.275 1050 5.2 15.43 254.8 SS
560 1980–11-01 13:00:00.42 60.80 97.55 720 5.2 16.60 51.5 TSG
570 1981–05-25 05:00:00.32 68.20 53.50 1511 5.5 17.10 338.6 SS
576 1981–09-02 03:59:59.99 60.60 55.70 2088 4.4 10.94 319.3 TSG
578 1981–09-26 05:00:00.28 46.790 48.313 1050 5.2 15.39 254.8 TSG
579 1981–09-26 05:03:59.94 46.771 48.304 1050 5.3 15.41 254.8 TSG
583 1981–10-22 14:00:00.36 63.80 97.55 581 5.1 17.64 41.9 TSG
592 1982–07-30 21:00:00.00 53.80 104.15 554 5.0 20.00 74.2 TSG
597 1982–09-25 18:00:00.18 64.35 91.80 554 5.2 15.74 35.8 TSG
613 1983–07-10 04:00:00.00 51.363 53.306 907 5.3 10.51 267.5 SS
614 1983–07-10 04:04:59.94 51.367 53.327 917 5.3 10.50 267.5 SS
615 1983–07-10 04:09:59.85 51.380 53.340 841 5.3 10.49 267.6 SS
618 1983–09-24 05:00:00.03 46.783 48.315 1050 5.2 15.39 254.8 SS
619 1983–09-24 05:05:00.03 46.788 48.297 1050 5.1 15.40 254.8 SS
620 1983–09-24 05:10:00.08 46.767 48.310 920 5.0 15.40 254.8 SS
621 1983–09-24 05:15:00.14 46.749 48.303 1100 5.2 15.42 254.7 SS
622 1983–09-24 05:19:59.93 46.754 48.288 950 5.4 15.42 254.8 SS
623 1983–09-24 05:25:00.00 46.766 48.274 1100 5.3 15.43 254.8 SS
639 1984–07-21 02:59:59.81 51.358 53.319 846 5.4 10.51 267.5 SS
640 1984–07-21 03:04:59.71 51.371 53.337 955 5.3 10.49 267.6 SS
641 1984–07-21 03:09:59.85 51.391 53.351 844 5.4 10.48 267.6 SS
643 1984–08-25 19:00:00.33 61.90 72.10 726 5.3 8.89 5.5 SS
649 1984–09-17 21:00:00.03 55.834 87.526 557 5.0 10.37 67.6 TSG
652 1984–10-27 06:00:00.10 46.90 48.15 1000 5.0 15.43 255.4 SS/TSG
653 1984–10-27 06:05:00.00 46.95 48.10 1000 5.0 15.43 255.6 SS/TSG
(continued on next page)
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Table 7 (continued)
Test No. Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Lat. (N) Long. (E) Depth (m) mb (P) Distance () Az () Instrument type
681 1987–07-24 02:00:00.0 61.45 112.80 1515 5.1 23.97 52.7 SS
684 1987–08-12 01:30:00.5 61.45 112.80 815 5.0 23.97 52.7 SS
686 1987–10-03 15:15:00.03 47.60 56.20 1002 5.3 10.49 244.3 SS/TSG
699 1988–08-22 16:20:00.07 66.280 78.491 829 5.3 13.83 13.9 SS/TSG
700 1988–09-06 16:19:59.94 61.361 48.092 820 4.8 14.49 313.7 SS/TSG
Notes on Table 7:
Test no. = nuclear test number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996).
Date and Time = origin time of the tests given in Sultanov et al. [30].
Latitude and Longitude = location of tests as given in Sultanov et al. [30].
mb(P) = body-wave magnitude of the tests given in Sultanov et al. [30].
Distance = epicentral distance in degrees from the PNE to Borovoye.
Az = azimuth in degrees from the station to PNE.
Precision of the origin time was indicated in Sultanov et al. by the decimal point. Further discussion of PNE ground truth information is given by Fujita et al. [8].
Table 8
Deglitched Borovoye data for Chinese Underground Nuclear Tests at Lop Nor, 1969–1995.
N Date Year-Mo-Da Time (hr:mn:sec) Latitude (N) Longitude (E) mb (P) Event id Instrument type Comments
01 1969–09-22 16:15:01.57 41.373 88.352 5.2 CH01 KODB C, tunnel
02 1976–10-17 05:00:01.37 41.734 88.383 4.9 CH04 SS B, tunnel
03 1978–10-14 01:00:00.25 41.511 88.772 4.9 CH05 SS/TSG A, shaft
04 1983–10-06 10:00:00.52 41.523 88.705 5.5 CH07 SS/TSG A, shaft
05 1984–10-03 06:00:00.58 41.577 88.706 5.4 CH08 SS A, shaft
06 1984–12-19 06:00:00.86 41.738 88.365 4.7 CH09 SS/TSG B, tunnel
07 1987–06-05 05:00:00.73 41.505 88.709 6.2 CH10 SS/TSG A, shaft
08 1990–08-16 05:00:00.16 41.511 88.742 6.2 CH13 SS/TSG A, shaft
09 1993–10-05 01:59:58.99 41.593 88.687 5.9 CH16 TSG A, shaft
10 1994–10-07 03:26:00.37 41.556 88.736 5.9 CH18 TSG A, shaft
11 1995–05-15 04:06:00.31 41.546 88.772 6.1 CH19 TSG A, shaft
Notes on Table 7.
Location and origin time from Engdahl [7]; teleseismic body-wave magnitude from the US Geological Survey’s Preliminary Determination of Epicenters. Precision locations
for Lop Nor nuclear explosions are given by Waldhauser et al. [31].
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the problem is more extensive than it may appear from just plot-
ting the seismogram trace.
There appear to be at least two sources of glitches. The most
easily corrected and explained are at time marks (see above)
characterized by a distinct period. These are typically the
glitches having the largest amplitude. There are some wave-
forms for which the time-mark glitch is the only problem. The
type of glitch found to be more difﬁcult and time-consuming
to correct, concerned instances that typically involved bit errors.
Thus, during interactive passes over problematic waveforms, we
found many glitches where the difference between the glitch
and the apparent waveform was either a power of 2 (e.g. 16,
32, 64, 128 ...) or a sum of powers of 2 (e.g. 48 = 16 + 32,
96 = 32 + 64, 80 = 16 + 64, ...) which represent bit failures either
in the original data stream or in the long-term deterioration
of the archive. Many of these small bit errors are readily found
by the deglitcher that will be discussed below. The labor to
do this work was time-consuming and required technical
judgments.
The most common defects in the salvaged Borovoye waveform
archive resulting from the ISTC project were single point glitches
and multiple point glitches of short duration. We did not investi-
gate the sources of the glitches in detail, but simply resolved to
repair them via interpolation to allow subsequent analysis of the
digital data. We discovered a range of glitch amplitudes in these
data, many smaller than waveform amplitudes, which compelled
us to design an automated, interactive script to perform the repair
work.The repair procedure developed and applied at Los Alamos
National Laboratory relies upon a high passed, differentiated trace
to identify glitches, and a fourth-order polynomial ﬁt to ﬁnd the
glitch edge points and perform the repair. Prior to analysis, we
marked poor data, such as saturated intervals, that the automated
procedure should ignore. We also removed the median and applied
ten-point tapers to the beginning and end of the entire waveform.
To identify glitches, we differentiated the trace, then applied a
two-pole, causal, high pass Butterworth ﬁlter with a corner set to
two-thirds the Nyquist frequency, removed the median, and took
absolute values. This procedure brought out small glitches that
would otherwise be buried in the waveform. The user sets a
threshold and a time window, and the procedure cycles through
that subset of glitches. Additional passes with lower thresholds
or different time windows may be run until the user decides that
repair is complete.
For each glitch that is identiﬁed using the high-pass, differ-
entiated trace, we set an initial analysis window of length ten
times the sample interval. A fourth-order polynomial is ﬁt to the
waveform data in this window, using L1 minimization to avoid
effects of the glitch. Glitches are deﬁned using a three-sigma
threshold based on a robust residual spread estimate (median
absolute deviation, MAD; e.g., [27]), and are replaced using the
polynomial coefﬁcients. The L1 ﬁt procedure matches ﬁve wave-
form points exactly, and those points may or may not include
the nearest edge points on either side of the glitch. As a ﬁne adjust-
ment, we add a linear function to the polynomial to ensure that
those edge points are matched exactly. The original glitch and
repaired waveform are then displayed, whereupon the user may:
seconds after explosion occurrence
Fig. 9. An example of a glitched recording (shown in black) and the result of deglitching (shown in red). This Borovoye record is for an underground nuclear test conducted at
the Semipalatinsk Test Site on 1984 December 02. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 10. 78 frequency-amplitude response curves of the KODB system, 1967–1973. To be correct, all responses need to have a minimum at a frequency of 0.15 Hz (intended to
suppress microseisms). Linear interpolation between frequencies of 0.1 and 0.2 Hz is not appropriate.
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and window endpoints, and reﬁt the waveform; (3) expand the
window, pick as above, and reﬁt the waveform; or (4) skip the
repair of that segment.
Fig. 9 shows two versions of a recording, lasting about 200 s, of a
Borovoye digital seismogram of an underground nuclear test. The
deglitched version is shown in red, in comparison with the glitched
record shown in black. The quality of the deglitched data is high
enough to enable detailed spectral analysis, and evaluation ofmethods of discrimination between earthquakes and explosions
[24].
The next two sub-sections describe the two earliest seismo-
graphic systems used at Borovoye.
5.2. The KOD digital seismograph system
The KOD system was intended for multichannel digital record-
ings of ground motion via magnetic tape for three components
Fig. 11. Frequency-amplitude calibration curves of 10-channel STsR-SS system are plotted.
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recording was provided by two separate seismometers: the rela-
tively long-period SKD seismometer; and the short-period SKM-3
seismometer, combined as described by Osadchiy and Daragan
[23].
However at Borovoye the KOD system was used somewhat dif-
ferently. It was modiﬁed to be based upon the SKM-3 seismometer,
using a pre-ampliﬁer with low self-noise, a post-ampliﬁer, and A/D
converter, and a switch with ten channels. Five even channels
(called KODB, with higher gain) were written to magnetic tape
using one tape recorder (LMR), and ﬁve uneven channels (called
KODM, with lower gain) were written to magnetic tape by using
another tape recorder. The full dynamic range on the two levels
was about 80 dB, providing for registration of ground displacement
from 3 nm to 12,000 nm in the band from 0.4 Hz to 5 Hz. Fig. 10
shows several amplitude responses of the KODB system.
Time corrections to the internal clock of the KOD system were
noted each 12 h with an accuracy of about 0.01 s, and time correc-
tions were noted in a log book. For example, the time correction tothe arrival time of the Pn-wave from the PNE of September 8, 1969,
is 0.55 s.
5.3. The STsR-SS digital seismograph system
Commonly abbreviated as the SS system, this consists of a 3-
component, short-period seismometer, namely SKM-3 (Kirnos
high-gain) and a 3-component, extended-period seismometer
called SKD (Kirnos-Arkhangel’skiy broadband) [28,29].
The STsR-SS system recorded a total of 10 channels on 17-track
tape with 11-bit analog-to-digital conversion. Usually, the data
streams consisted of signals from 3-component short-period, 3-
component extended-period, and a low-gain short-period vertical
component.
Shishkevish [28] called the SKD seismometer with the natural
period, T0 = 25 s, an extended-period seismometer, a term that we
also adopted. The SKM-3 seismometer is the later model of SKM
and has an adjustable natural period, T0, between 1.5 to 3.5 s
[28]. Hence, it is also called a short-to-intermediate-period
Table 9
Characteristics of the three seismograph systems used to provide digitized ground motions at Borovoye (BRV).
System Seismometer T0 (s) Ds Chan name Gain (C/lm) freqn (Hz) Dt (ms) Chan no. Time period
KODB (high-gain) SKM-3 3.5 0.7 SHZ 3386 1.8 30 1 67-02-26
SHN 2940 1.8 30 3 –73-10-26
SHE 3354 1.8 30 4
SLZb 423 1.8 30 2
KODM (low-gain) SLZ 421 1.8 30 1 67-06-29
SLN 321 1.8 30 3 –73-10-26
SLE 371 1.8 30 4
SHZm 3386 1.8 30 2
SS SKM-3 2 0.5 s07Z 1249 2 32 7 73-06-06
s08N 1330 2 32 8 –82-07-04
s09E 1336 2 32 9
1
LG(Z) s07Z 2059 2 24 7 82-08-21
s08N 2054 2 24 8 –91-07-15
s09E 2057 2 24 9
s06Z 20 2 96 6
81-08-14–
SKD 25 0.5 l02Z 3.31 0.1 192 2 73-06-06
l03N 3.36 0.1 192 3 –82-07-04
l04E 3.36 0.1 192 4
l02Z 5.19 0.1 192 2 82-08-23
l03N 5.14 0.1 192 3 –91-07-15
l04E 5.17 0.1 192 4
LG l01Z 0.51 0.1 192 1 82-08-23
l05N 0.51 0.1 192 5 –91-07-15
l10E 0.51 0.1 192 10
TSG KSVM 1.5 0.5 sZ01 50 1 26 1 80-07-20–96-01-27
sZ02 4600 1 26 2 83-12-16–96-01-27
KSM 1.5 0.5 sZ03 1000 1 26 3 85-03-23
sN04 1000 1 26 4 –96-01-27
sE05 1000 1 26 5
KS 1.5 0.71 sZ06 1000 1.5 26 6 85-03-23–96-01-27
sZ07 2000 1.5 26 7 74-12-16
sN08 2000 1.5 26 8 –82-01-30
sE09 2000 1.5 26 9
sZ07 4500 1.5 26 7 82-03-24
sN08 4500 1.5 26 8 –91-01-27
sE09 4500 1.5 26 9
KSM 1.5 0.5 sZ10 100,000 1 26 10 85-01-22
sN11 100,000 1 26 11 –88-10-31
sE12 100,000 1 26 12
DS 20 0.71 lZ19 50 0.1 312 19 74-07-12
lN20 50 0.1 312 20 –88-06-28
lE21 50 0.1 312 21
DSM 28 0.71 lZ22 1000 0.07 312 22 75-11-19
lN23 1000 0.07 312 23 –88-12-02
lE24 1000 0.07 312 24
lZ15 10 0.07 312 15 85-01-26
lN16 10 0.07 312 16 –88-12-02
lN17 10 0.07 312 17
DS 20 0.71 lZ13 50 0.1 312 13 83-11-03–84-01-18
lN14 50 0.1 312 14 83-11-03–85-02-13
Notes on Table 9.
KOD (KODB and KODM) systems were operated from 1966–Nov 1973 and had polarity reversal on all channels; STsR-SS (SS) and STsR-TSG (TSG) systems were operated from
Feb. 1973 to 1995.
T0 = seismometer natural period in seconds.
Ds = seismometer damping constant, critical damping = 0.71.
Gain = sensitivity in counts/lm for ground displacement.
freqn = normalization frequency, where the gain is measured.
Dt = sampling interval in milliseconds.
LG = low-gain channels and (Z) indicates that it is only vertical-component.
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mometer in our data rescue project.
From 1973 June 06 to 1981 June 30, 3-component short-
period signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on
channels 7, 8 and 9 for vertical-, NS-, and EW-components,
respectively.
These three-component data are assigned component names
s07Z, s08 N and s09E; low-gain vertical-component SKM-3 data
were recorded on channel 1 (s01Z); 3-component extended-periodsignals from the SKD seismometer are recorded on channels 2, 3,
and 4 (102Z, 103 N and 104E); and channels 5, 6 and 10 were
unused.
From 1981 August 14 to 1982 July 04, 3-component short-pe-
riod signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on chan-
nels 7, 8 and 9 for vertical-, NS-, and EW-components, respectively.
The sampling interval for these channels was changed from 0.032 s
to 0.024 s. The low-gain vertical-component SKM-3 data were
recorded on channel 6 (s06Z) with a sampling interval of 0.096 s.
Fig. 12. First of seven sets of BRV seismograms on the KOD system for a UNE at the Balapan area of the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan; test of 1968 June 19.
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were recorded on channels 2, 3, and 4 (l02Z, l03 N and l04E); and
channels 1, 5 and 10 were unused. Although the sampling intervals
have changed for short-period channels (6, 7, 8, and 9), the shapes
of the amplitude responses for these channels followed the pre-
vious period.
From 1982 August 23 to 1991 July 15, 3-component short-
period signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on
channels 7, 8 and 9 (component name: s07Z, s08 N and s09E);
low-gain vertical-component signals from the SKM-3 seis-
mometer were recorded on channel 6 (s06Z); 3-component
extended-period signals from SKD seismometer were recorded
on channels 2, 3, and 4 (102Z, l03 N and 104E); and low-gain
3-component extended-period SKD data were recorded on
channels 1, 5 and 10 (101Z, 105 N and 110E); hence all of
the 10 channels of the STsR-SS system were utilized during
this period, but we note that the shapes of the amplitude
responses for all channels were changed from those of the pre-
vious periods.Fig. 11 shows 40 available frequency-amplitude calibration
curves for the STsR-SS system, for the period 1973 to 1991 given
in the Borovoye waveform data archive.5.4. Summary of instrument responses at BRV
In Table 9, we summarize responses for all three systems at
Borovoye: KOD, SS, and TSG. Extensive additional details on all
three systems, and how they changed with time, are to be found
in a technical report by Kim et al. [14], available on-line as
http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Doc/AFRL-RV-HA-
TR-2010-1024_07C0004_Final.pdf.6. Examples of regional signals
More than 3700 deglitched and calibrated seismograms from
nuclear explosions in Eurasia, many of them recorded at regional
distances, are for many users the main result of this project. Prior
Fig. 13. First of 78 sets of BRV seismograms on the SS system for a UNE at the Balapan area of the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan; test of 1975 October 29.
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Laboratory had become familiar with some of these data, in par-
ticular with waveforms recorded on the TSG system. With our sec-
ond data release we have approximately trebled the number of
waveforms analyzed, by successfully processing the data recorded
by earlier systems. Here we give examples of the waveforms from
all three systems.
From Table 2 we see that these thousands of waveforms
can be organized into 497 sets, each set corresponding to
one particular underground nuclear explosion (UNE), as
recorded on one of the three different systems at Borovoye.
These waveforms, now deglitched and documented with instru-
ment responses, are the main result of this project, together
with preliminary analyses of these data as presented in the
US at Monitoring Research Reviews in 2007, 2008, and 2009
[12,13,5]. Details of the sampling rate and instrument response
of the three systems emerged throughout the years in which
we did our work. Difﬁculties of the KOD system included
Soviet publications describing the impulse response that didnot match our own information from stations operators in
Kazakhstan. Difﬁculties of the SS system included changes in
sampling rate and an appreciation that the data are aliased
to some degree—details that were not thoroughly understood
until late in the project.
We have prepared all 497 of these waveform sets as a series of
PDF documents to enable potential users to get a sense of which
seismograms are likely to be useful for reading arrival times (a
high-gain channel may be best), or for computing spectra (a low-
gain channel may be best for this purpose), or for coda studies
(both low-gain and high-gain channels are relevant). These ﬁles
are available to interested users online via http://www.ldeo.
columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Arch/BRV_arch_deglitched.html
but there are far too many to include in this paper. Instead, to pre-
sent our results in an orderly way in this section, we give 5 sets of
examples, in Fig. 12 through Fig. 16, each set representing the seis-
mograms from one particular underground nuclear test as
recorded on a particular digital seismographic system—either
KOD, or SS, or TSG.
Fig. 14. First of 73 sets of BRV seismograms on the TSG system for a UNE at the Balapan area of the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan; test of 1974 December 27.
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Our choice, in culling the 497 sets down to 5 has been, ﬁrst, to
show for the Balapan region of the Semipalatinsk Test Site in
Kazakhstan, the ﬁrst UNE as recorded on the KOD system
(Fig. 12), on the SS system (Fig. 13), and on the TSG system
(Fig. 14). And then we show the last PNE recorded on the SS system
(Fig. 15), and ﬁnally the last UNE at the Lop Nor Test site as
recorded on the TSG system (Fig. 16).
Thus, Fig. 12 shows the ﬁrst of seven sets of BRV seismograms
on the KOD system for a UNE at Balapan (the test of 1968 June
19 recorded at less than a thousand km). It shows high-gain and
low-gain channels, and immediately it is apparent which channels
are appropriate for picking arrival times (high-gain), measuring
spectral levels (low-gain) and quantifying coda (both high-gain
and low-gain). This is a short-period set of records, which may
be compared and contrasted with the seismograms (also from
Balapan explosions) shown in Fig. 13 (SS) and Fig. 14 (TSG), which
contain extended band-width information, and which, for example
contain Rg signals (a Rayleigh wave, excited only by very shallow
seismic sources). The longer-period records have Rg as the stron-
gest phase at this regional distance.There is a total of 343 sets of records for UNEs in all sub-regions
of the Semipalatinsk Test Site, and these regional signals with their
Pg, Pn, Sn, Lg, and Rg phases are now available for study of different
source effects as documented by a digital station, Borovoye, that
long operated at the same distance from the test site. In contrast
with these regional signals, the teleseismic recordings from
Novaya Zemlya UNEs show impulsive teleseismic P-wave arrivals.
Fig. 15 shows some of the SS system seismograms for an unu-
sual PNE conducted in the Soviet Union on 1984 July 21, consisting
of three separate nuclear shots ﬁve minutes apart. P-arrivals are
very impulsive, with weak S-waves arriving later. And ﬁnally
Fig. 16 shows some of the TSG system seismograms for a UNE at
the Lop Nor Test Site, in China, for the explosion of 1995 May 15.
The regional waves are still quite strong, though teleseismic waves
are arriving also. The Rg phase again is an indication of a very shal-
low seismic source.7. Concluding summary and comments
More than 2000 nuclear test explosions were conducted during
the Cold War (about three-quarters of them, underground). They
Fig. 15. Last of 38 sets of BRV seismograms on the SS system for a PNE in the Soviet Union; tests of 1984 July 21, being three separate shots ﬁve minutes apart, centered at
(51.37N, 53.34E), depth 900, 15 kt, mb 5.
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in the atmosphere and then mostly underground after the mid-
1960s. They represent an extreme activity in human history.
Most of them took place in an era when there were very few seis-
mographic stations operating with the high standards routinely
achieved via broadband high-dynamic-range instrumentation
available today.
This project took advantage of Soviet-era digital seismic record-
ings, all of them made at the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory in
Kazakhstan, of ground motion from numerous underground
nuclear explosions that occurred globally over a period of three
decades, from 1966 to 1996. We have prepared these recordings
in a modern format, to make them usable by the seismic monitor-
ing community for numerous ongoing and future studies of Earth
structure, attenuation characteristics, and explosion source physics
including source representation by body force equivalents and
associated source spectra. We have paid special attention to the
recordings of underground nuclear explosions conducted in
Eurasia, because many of them took place at regional distances
(typically, less than a thousand km) from Borovoye, so that they
contain the types of seismic signal most useful for detecting and
characterizing small nuclear explosions.To produce the newly-formatted signals required major efforts
at Los Alamos National Laboratory to remove glitches in the origi-
nal records, and at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory to
obtain instrument responses. Three different recording systems
operated at Borovoye: the KOD system from 1967 to 1973; the
SS system from 1973 to 1990; and the TSG system from 1974 to
1995. Each system included channels of low-gain and high-gain
recording; and each system included vertical, north/south, and
east/west channels. In the ﬁnal years of this data rescue, particular
attention was paid to data from the KOD and SS systems, which
had not previously been deglitched and instrument-corrected.
We have prepared waveforms from nuclear explosions at the fol-
lowing ﬁve test sites: Balapan (1269 traces), Degelen (1146 traces),
and Murzhik (160 traces), all in Kazakhstan on the Semipalatinsk
Test site; Novaya Zemlya (461 traces) in Russia; and Lop Nor
(120 traces) in China; and also from many Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions (552 traces) in Russia. Although the dynamic range of
speciﬁc channels is limited by the low number of bits in the record-
ing system, the scientiﬁc content of the signals across the many
different channels approaches that for modern recording systems.
The improved Borovoye archive now provides many practical
examples of the types of explosion signals that modern monitoring
Fig. 16. Last of eight sets of BRV seismograms on the TSG system for a UNE at the Lop Nor Test Site, China; test of 1995 May 15.
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must be designed to detect and identify.
From a long-term perspective (centuries and longer), it is
important to archive high-quality signals from past explosions, to
make them usable for diverse research at present and in the future,
because they are unique and are so much better than earthquake
signals for certain types of study of the interior of planet Earth
(see, e.g., [3]). In future we can expect that theory and computation
will improve our capability to extract information from seismic
signals. High-quality recordings will thus continue to provide a
basis for increasing our knowledge of Earth structure, as geophysi-
cists in the future develop better methods of analysis applied to the
best signals recorded in the past. This is a project that must be
maintained long-term, augmented to archive high quality signals
from all energetic explosions especially from those at yield levels
that will not be achieved again unless nuclear explosions resume
on a large scale.
The example provided in this paper, of a successful data rescue
applied to a Soviet archive of explosions recorded at regional dis-
tances, needs to be repeated for nuclear explosions conducted inthe early decades of active weapons testing by the United States
and the United Kingdom, by France, and by China.Acknowledgments
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